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CASE NOTES
available as an effective means of eliminating or reducing the use of
threats of cancellation to prevent testimony in a malpractice action.
Thus, the decision in L'Orange may be considered significant
only in the sense that it provides relief for a doctor whose malprac-
tice insurance has been cancelled because of his willingness to testify.
The case may also deter an insurance company's unrestrained use of
cancellation, and may be useful in the obtaining of an injunction. It
does not, however, provide a clear and effective means of eliminating
such attempts to suppress evidence on the part of insurance com-
panies.
The scope of this problem and the apparent inability of the courts
to devise adequate solutions indicate the need for either administrative
or legislative action. Although malpractice insurance companies must
have some discretion in cancelling the policies of competent physi-
cians," certain basic measures should be adopted to prevent insurance
companies from threatening potential doctor-witnesses. The use of
broad provisions allowing the insurer to cancel at any time during the
term of the policy must be modified. This could be accomplished
either by specifying grounds for cancellation, or by including a pro-
vision stating that cancellation or the threat of cancellation to prevent
the insured doctor from testifying shall be deemed a breach of the
contract on the part of the insurer; liquidated damages for the breach
also should be stipulated. Premiums should be regulated so that the
threat of rate increases will not be substituted for the threat of can-
cellation. A practicing physician should be able to buy adequate
liability insurance at a reasonable rate, and insurance companies are
entitled to reasonable profits, but discriminatory rate increases to pre-
vent testimony should be eliminated.
The increase in malpractice litigation, arising out of the ever-
expanding demand for medical services, and the difficulty experienced
by plaintiffs in securing expert testimony demand thorough investiga-
tion of malpractice insurance practices. The enactment of compre-
hensive regulatory legislation would help to insure the continued
vitality of medical practice and the integrity of the judicial process
in malpractice suits.
EDWARD P. DOHERTY
Municipal Bonds and Tax Levies—Referendum—Application
of the "One Person, One Vote" Principle—Lance v. Board of Educ. 1
At a special election called by the Board of Education of Roane
County, West Virginia, more than 51 percent of those voting ap-
proved proposals calling for the issuance of municipal bonds and
the levy of additional taxes to finance school repairs and other neces-
50 See Sanders, Money Well Spent, Trial, Feb.-Mar., 1970, at 16, where the author
stated: "One insurance executive stated recently that nationally 22 companies have
withdrawn from writing medical malpractice insurance because of excessive losses."
1 — W. Va. —, 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969).
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sary capital expenditures.2
 However, the West Virginia Constitution
requires that such bond proposals be approved by more than 60
percent of the participating voters for passage and, therefore, the
proposals were defeated. 3
 On appeal from an action for declaratory
judgment brought by voters in the unsuccessful majority, the Supreme
Court of West Virginia HELD: the 60 percent requirement of the
state constitution is in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution? By requiring
approval of three-fifths of the persons voting, the votes of the majority
were diluted and debased, because two negative votes had the same
effect on the outcome of the election as did three positive votes.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that not only
does a citizen have the right to vote,' but that this right includes the
2 The bonds, in the amount of $1,830,000, were to be issued for the purposes of
alleviating overcrowded classrooms and school facilities, removing fire hazards, providing
more adequate and modern vocational and educational facilities, and meeting the needs
of disadvantaged children. Id. at —, 170 S.E.2d at 785.
W. Va. Const. art. 10, § 1 states:
Subject to the exceptions in this section contained, taxation shall be uniform
throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in
proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law.... [T]he legislature
shall further provide by general law, for increasing the maximum rates, autho-
rized to be fixed, by the different levying bodies upon all classes of property,
by submitting the question to the voters of the taxing units affected, but no
increase shall be effective unless at least sixty per cent of the qualified voters
shall favor such increase....
W. Va. Coast. art. 10, § 8 states:
No county, city, school district, or municipal corporation, except in cases where
such corporations have already authorized their bonds to be issued, shall herein-
after be allowed to become indebted, in any manner, or for any purpose to an
amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate, exceeding five per
centum on the value of the taxable property.... [Ma debt shall be contracted
under this section, unless all questions connected with the same, shall have been
first submitted to a vote of the people, and have received three-fifths of all the
votes cast for and against the same.
W. Va. Code Ann. § 11-8-16 (1966) states:
The local levying body shall submit to the voters within their political sub-
division, the question of the additional levy at either a general or special election.
If at least sixty per cent of the voters cast their ballots in favor of the additional
levy, the local levying body may impose the additional levy. . . .
W. Va. Code Ann. § 13-1-4 (1966) states:
No debt shall be contracted or bonds issued under this article until all ques-
tions connected with the same shall have been first submitted to a vote of the
qualified electors of the political division for which the bonds are to be issued,
and shall have received three fifths of all the votes cast for and against the
same. . . .
W. Va. Code Ann. § 13-1-14 (1966) states:
If three fifths of all the votes cast for and against the proposition to in-
cur debt and issue negotiable bonds shall be in favor of the same, the govern-
ing body of the political division shall, by resolution, authorize the issuance of
such bonds....
4 Lance v. Board of Educ., — W. Va. —, 170 S.E.2d 783, 791 (1969).
5 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). This decision held that there is a fed-
erally protected right to vote in congressional elections, based upon art I,
	 4 of the
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right to have that vote counted." The Court has also held that this
right cannot be denied or diluted,' either by alteration of ballots' or
by "stuffing" the ballot box with fictitious ballots.' The rule that every
vote must be counted equally, and that votes of citizens who reside in
one area cannot be given more weight than those from another area,
has become known as the "one person, one vote" doctrine. This doc-
trine was developed in a series of cases dealing with election of govern-
ment representatives and the apportionment of election districts. The
Lance decision extends the doctrine by applying it to tax and bond
referenda. However, since the cases in which the "one person, one
vote" doctrine was developed are distinguishable on several grounds
from the present case, Lance is an unwarranted extension of this
principle.
The "one person, one vote" doctrine was originally developed in
response to the problem of equality of apportionment of congressional
districts. In Baker v. Carr" the Court determined that the apportion-
ment of such districts may be challenged in federal court on the basis
that it results in the dilution of votes. This principle was applied in
Wesberry v. Sanders," where the Court held that congressional dis-
tricts had to be drawn so as to represent equal numbers of persons to
ensure equality of voting power throughout the state. Other decisions
have applied the same principle to election districts of state legisla-
tors" as well as for local government officials such as county board
members."
The "one person, one vote" rule also means that a "unit" system
for compiling votes cannot be used to defeat equality of voting power.
In Gray v. Sanders" the Court focused its attention upon a primary
election for United States Senator. To determine the winning candi-
date, each county was given one vote, regardless of the size of its
population. The Court held that as the counties were not composed of
equal numbers of voters, this method denied the individual voter the
right to have his vote counted equally with all other votes cast, and
that the total state-wide vote, and not the outcome in each county,
should have been the determining factor in the election. The Court
stated:
Once the geographical unit for which a representative
is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the elec-
Constitution of the United States. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 554 (1964), the
Supreme Court stated that there is also a constitutionally protected right to vote in state
elections.
6 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
7 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
8 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
9 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
10 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
12 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
14 372 US. 368 (1963).
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tion are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, what-
ever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their
income, and wherever their home may be in that geographic
unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'" (Emphasis added.)
While these decisions appear to support the basic rationale of the
Lance decision, that votes of equally situated persons may not be
diluted so that they have unequal effect on the outcome of an election,
there are two fundamental bases of distinction. First, Baker, Wes-
berry, and Gray involved dilution of voting strength resulting from
the voters' residence in unequally constituted sub-units of a larger
geographic unit. The essence of the holdings in these cases is that
equal representation of voters cannot be avoided by dividing a larger
unit into unequally populated smaller units, each to elect one repre-
sentative. Thus, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims stated:
[I] f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in
one part of the State should be given two times, or five times,
or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of
the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote
of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effec-
tively diluted . Of course, the effect of ... legislative dis-
tricting schemes which give the same number of representa-
tives to unequal numbers of constituents is identical . . . .
Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method
or means, merely because of where they happen to reside,
hardly seems justifiable." (Emphasis added.)
In Lance, dilution by residence as defined in the earlier decisions
was not at issue, as all qualified voters within one individual county
were eligible to vote, and there was no combination or comparison
of these votes with votes from other counties. Thus, the site of the
voters' residence did not in itself determine the weight given to a
particular vote.
The second basis upon which the Lance decision can be dis-
tinguished is that each of the earlier cases involved the election of
governmental representatives. Lana, however, involved a completely
different type of election, a referendum. The court, not recognizing
this distinction, interpreted the word "representation" to include both
types of election in its attempt to reconcile its decision with the prior
cases. It is submitted, however, that this was incorrect, as a referendum
election differs fundamentally from a general election of governmental
representatives.
If citizens do not have the opportunity to participate directly in
government but, rather, participate through elected representatives,
16 Id. at 379.
26 377 U.S. at 562-63.
556
CASE NOTES
then the "one person, one vote" cases hold that it is a denial of equal
protection to permit one representative to speak for fewer persons
than does another. Thus, in this initial phase of policy making every
voter must have the opportunity to participate equally with all other
voters.
The "one person, one vote" doctrine, however, has never been
applied to the second level of the representative process, that is, the
level at which the elected representatives make the actual decisions ef-
fecting government policy. While each representative has one vote,
some measures may require the approval of more than 50 percent of
the representatives. No provision of the United States Constitution has
ever been held to bar such requirements. It is this second level process,
in which representatives participate directly in governmental decisions,
that is comparable to decision making by referendum. In the latter,
voters have a direct voice in the decision to be made.
The Lance court, however, erroneously equated the act of electing
representatives to make governmental decisions with the act of voting
in a referendum. In reaching its result, the court relied upon that
portion of Article 2, Section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution which
states: "Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in the
government . . . ."" (Emphasis added.) On the basis of this clause
the court observed:
The West Virginia constitutional ... provisions for the hold-
ing of elections by which voters may determine whether
bonds shall be issued and whether extra levies of taxes shall
be made represent some of the very few instances in which
the individual voter is permitted to have a direct and wholly
effective voice in government." (Emphasis added.)
However, article 2, section 4 was, to some extent, misconstrued by
the court, for taken in its entirety the section deals not with equality
of direct participation in policy making, but rather with equal repre-
sentation in the legislature. In full the section states: "Every citizen
shall be entitled to equal representation in the government, and, in
all apportionments of representation, equality of numbers of those
entitled thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved.m° It is
submitted that the language of this section cannot be reasonably con-
strued to require that in a direct referendum every vote must be
counted so that a simple majority will determine the outcome. The
section is intended to apply only to the initial election of representa-
tives, and not to the question whether there should be complete
equality on the part of voters directly participating in policy making.
The Lance court relied in part upon a case that involved a re-
ferendum rather than an election of representatives. However, that
17 - W. Va. at —, 170 S.E.2d at 786.
18 Id. at —, 170 S.E.2d at 787:
19 W. Va. Const. art. 2, § 4.
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decision, State ex rd. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd.' does not sup-
port the holding in Lance because the circumstances of the case make
it more analogous to the "residence" aspect of the "one person, one
vote" cases than to the direct referendum in Lance.
The Witt case involved the constitutionality of a provision that
adoption of an amendment to the state constitution required the ap-
proval of two-thirds of the participating voters of each county?' The
Supreme Court of New Mexico held that this provision violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. The decision was based upon the reapportionment
cases, all of which dealt with voting for legislative representatives.
Recognizing this as a possible basis for distinguishing the earlier cases
and thus as a source of potential criticism of its decision, the 'court
stated: "We can see no rational basis to distinguish between voting
on representatives in the legislature, and voting on constitutional
amendments. One is no more a necessary ingredient of our democratic
process than the other."" However, this decision is merely an exten-
sion of the earlier reapportionment cases in that it invalidates a pro-
vision designed to grant equal influence on the outcome of an election
to geographical districts composed of unequal numbers of people. As
has been shown, this principle is distinguishable from the one at issue in
Lance, thus, the decision would seem to be inapplicable to the case.
In addition to the invalidated provision, the New Mexico Con-
stitution required approval by three-fourths of the voters of the entire
state for passage of the proposed amendment. The Wilt case held that
this meant 75 percent of those voting on the particular proposal.
Because more than 81 percent of those voters approved the amend-
ment, the constitutionality of the provision was not challenged.
However, this requirement is directly analogous to the 60 percent
requirement in Lance as both demanded approval by, more than a
simple majority throughout the geographic area involved. Commenting
upon the three-fourths requirement the court stated: "No serious at-
tack is made on the constitutionality of this provision." 23 This may be
interpreted as indicating that such a requirement was not viewed by
the court to be in conflict with the "one person, one vote" principle.
In support of its position that the "one person, one vote" doctrine
is generally applicable to referendum elections, the Lance court cited
two recent United States Supreme Court decisions, Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15 24 and Cipriano v. City of Houma."
Kramer involved the constitutionality of a state law limiting the
20 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968).
21 The two-thirds requirement applied only to amendments affecting provisions as
to the elective franchise or education. The proposed amendment at issue here provided
for absentee voting. Id. at 685, 437 P.2d at 146.
22 Id. at 689-90, 437 P.2d at 150-51.
23 Id. at 690, 437 P.2d at 151.
24 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
20 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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franchise in elections dealing with school affairs in certain school
districts to parents or guardians of school children, and to owners or
lessees of taxable property and their spouses. The state alleged it
could limit the franchise to those "primarily interested" in the out-
come of such elections? In Cipriano the statute in question permitted
only taxpayers owning property to vote in elections called to determine
whether municipal bonds should be issued. Both restrictions were held
to be unconstitutional as a denial of voting rights to particular classes
of individuals on the basis of interest in the outcome of the election.'
These decisions involving voter qualifications or exclusions, however,
are distinguishable from the situation in Lance, which involved the per-
centage of qualified votes required for passage of a referendum.
That is, all voters otherwise qualified to vote in federal, state, and
county elections could vote in the special election in Lance; the issue
was whether the weight of the votes cast had to be equal.
Although the Kramer and Cipriano decisions may be distinguished
from Lance, they both refer to the idea that a "compelling state in-
terest" must be demonstrated to sustain the exclusion of otherwise
qualified voters." Applying such a test" to the 60 percent require-
ment at issue in Lance, the West Virginia court might have discerned
reasons for upholding the election and statutes, and thus for finding
that the requirement did not violate the equal protection clause.
In requiring approval by 60 percent of the voters, the West
Virginia legislature appears to have desired to protect municipalities
and counties from undertaking additional financial burdens without
first determining that more than a majority of its taxpayers, the per-
sons to bear the additional burden, approved the proposal. The serious-
ness of undertaking such burdens and the need for the state to protect
itself and its political subdivisions from financial overextension could
be precisely the type of "compelling interest" that a state would have
to demonstrate in order to avoid violating the equal protection rights of
voters. That is, the nature of the issues involved in levying additional
taxes might be such as requires some form of protection for taxpayers
as is embodied in the constitutional provisions requiring 60 percent
approval. However, the court apparently took a contrary view, stating:
"We are unwilling to concede that a determination of issues such as
those involved in this case cannot be safely entrusted to a majority of
the voters!"30
If the "compelling state interest" theory is correct, it would not
be reasonable to assert, as did the Lance court, that equal protection
of voters is absolute and must be applied to all situations. The state-
ment in Gray v. Sanders that "once the class of voters is chosen and
28 395 U.S. 621, 631.
27 Id. at 632; 395 U.S. 701, 706.
28 395 U.S. 621, 627; 395 U.S. 701, 704.
29 The Kramer and Cipriano cases do not define what constitutes a "compelling state
interest," so there is no guideline for applying the doctrine in the present situation.
88 - W. Va. at —, 170 S.E.2d at 791.
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their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which
equality of voting power may be evaded,"" was interpreted as meaning
that nothing other than a simple majority can be required for passage
of a proposal put before qualified voters at a general or special elec-
tion, particularly when a referendum is involved.
While equal protection of voting rights has been extended beyond
the initial protection against discrimination when voting in a federal
election, the Lance situation presents, for the reasons expressed above,
an unwarranted extension of the "one person, one vote" doctrine. The
West Virginia court, seemingly anxious to validate the appropriation
of funds for badly needed school repairs, was willing to accept the
principles of a line of cases only superficially analogous, without
demonstrating concern for the possible consequences that could arise
from its broad pronouncements. If carried to its logical conclusion, the
Lance decision would result in applying the "one person, one vote"
doctrine to invalidate all but majority rule in all types of elections, a
result which the "one person, one vote" cases do not require.
SUSAN J. SELVERN
31 372 U.S. at 381.
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